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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
E.M. is a student at the Learning Center for 
Exceptional Children (“LCEC”). LCEC is a private school for 
children with intellectual disabilities. E.M.’s individualized 
education program—her federally-mandated education plan 
created by her parents, teachers, and local public-school 
system—says that she should attend LCEC and integrated 
classes with students from Today’s Learning Center (“TLC”). 
TLC is a private school for regular-education students that 
shares classroom space with LCEC. The New Jersey 
Department of Education (“the Department”) asserts that it 
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has not approved LCEC or TLC to teach integrated classes of 
regular-education students and students with disabilities. 
Therefore, the Department directed LCEC to confirm that it 
would not place its public-school students with disabilities in 
classrooms with private-school regular-education students. 
LCEC agreed under protest.  
E.M.’s parents—D.M. and L.M.—on behalf of E.M. 
and LCEC sued the Department and two of its officials, 
challenging the Department’s regulation of LCEC as arbitrary 
and capricious, and sought preliminary injunctive relief. The 
District Court granted E.M. a preliminary injunction under 
the so-called “stay-put” rule of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The injunction allowed 
her to attend classes with TLC’s regular-education students 
during the pendency of the case. We will remand the case 
with the injunction intact for additional fact finding. 
I. 
1. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
imposes conditions on any State that accepts certain federal 
educational funding assistance. New Jersey accepts this 
assistance and is bound by those conditions. 
Under IDEA, a State must provide a free appropriate 
public education to all students with intellectual disabilities. 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).1 A free appropriate public 
education is, among other things, an education that is 
provided in conformity with an individualized education 
program for that child. Id. § 1401(9)(D). A State can provide 
                                              
1 The United States Department of Education has 
issued implementing regulations for IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. pt. 
300. However, the general statutory provisions are sufficient 
to provide background. 
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a free appropriate public education to a child with disabilities 
by paying for that child to attend a private school if the State 
ensures that the private school meets the same standards that 
the State requires of public schools and if the private school 
accords with the child’s individualized education program. Id. 
§ 1412(a)(10)(B). The New Jersey Department of Education 
approves private-school programs to serve these public-
school students with disabilities, but the approval process is 
for specific programs only and is not a general certification of 
the school. N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-7.1(a). 
An individualized education program—frequently 
abbreviated as “IEP”—must be created and in effect for each 
child with disabilities by the beginning of each school year. 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d)(2)(A). Each year, a child’s 
IEP is developed by a team that includes the child’s parents, 
at least one regular-education teacher, at least one special-
education teacher, a representative of the local educational 
agency, and the child himself or herself, if appropriate. Id. 
§ 1414(d)(1)(B). If needed to interpret evaluation results or to 
provide other expertise, additional individuals may participate 
in creating the IEP. Id. The IEP should state the child’s 
present levels of achievement and performance, provide 
annual goals, and explain how progress will be measured. Id. 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The IEP should also state “the special 
education and related services and supplementary aids and 
services . . . to be provided to the child” and “the anticipated 
frequency, location, and duration of those services and 
modifications.” Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV), (VII). Once an 
IEP has been created, it may only be amended by the entire 
IEP team or by agreement between the parents and the local 
educational agency. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(F). 
IDEA also requires that States provide a dispute 
resolution system should a parent or public agency dispute 
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whether the child is receiving a free appropriate public 
education. Either party may seek mediation or present a 
complaint to an administrative law judge, who will then 
adjudicate the parties’ disagreement. Id. § 1415(b)(6), (c)(2), 
(d), (e), (f). When parties go before an administrative law 
judge, the process is called a “due process hearing.” Id. 
§ 1415(f). Any party aggrieved by the ALJ’s findings can 
administratively appeal. Id. § 1415(g). Any party still 
aggrieved after the administrative appeal may file a civil 
action in a state court of competent jurisdiction or in a federal 
district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2). 
Importantly, IDEA requires that “during the pendency 
of any proceedings” the child “shall remain in the then-
current educational placement” unless the parents and the 
state or local educational agency agree otherwise. Id. 
§ 1415(j). This is commonly referred to as IDEA’s “stay-put” 
rule. 
2. 
The Learning Center for Exceptional Children is a 
private school for students with disabilities. It opened in 
1978. During the times relevant to this lawsuit, LCEC leased 
classroom space in a building in Clifton, New Jersey. Also 
sharing this space was a private school for regular-education 
students, Today’s Learning Center. The principal of LCEC is 
also the principal of TLC. 
LCEC has received authorization from the New Jersey 
Department of Education to educate public-school students 
with disabilities referred to LCEC by the students’ local 
public-school systems into certain programs. LCEC received 
its most recent approval in 2011. In its application for this 
approval, LCEC listed one of the programs as “integration of 
disabled and non-disabled peers.” App. at 25 (alteration 
omitted). The application, however, did not mention that 
 6 
 
LCEC students would attend integrated classes with TLC’s 
students. The Department has never approved TLC to educate 
any public-school students with disabilities. 
E.M. is a ten-year-old girl who most recently was in 
the fourth grade. Her local public-school system, Hoboken, 
classified her as “Multiply Disabled” and eligible to receive 
special education services. Beginning in January 2011, she 
has attended LCEC, as stated in her IEPs for each year. 
“LCEC was specifically selected as the out-of-district 
educational placement for E.M. due to her unique academic 
and social/emotional needs.” App. at 22. For the 2014-15 
school year, “[E.M.’s] IEP calls for her to [be] integrated with 
regular education students in a small classroom at TLC with a 
low student-to-teacher ratio.” Id. She is also to receive a one-
on-one, in-classroom assistant and other curricular 
modifications. 
In December 2013, after an on-site inspection, the 
Department requested a “statement of assurance that non-
public school students from TLC are not in class with public 
school students from LCEC.” App. at 26. The Department 
subsequently denied LCEC’s request to locate to a different 
building, stating that it did so because LCEC educated its 
public-school students with disabilities with TLC’s regular 
education students. The Department also changed LCEC’s 
approval status to “conditional approval,” which meant that 
LCEC could not enroll any new public school students. See 
N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-7.10(b)(1)(i). LCEC filed 
petitions for review of both decisions with the New Jersey 
Office of Administrative Law, which are still pending 
although a decision is expected shortly. In July 2014, LCEC 
assured the Department that it would not place its public-
school students with disabilities in classrooms with TLC’s 
regular-education students, despite the fact that some of its 
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students’ IEPs—such as E.M.’s—called for it. LCEC remains 
on conditional approval status. 
 
3. 
On July 23, 2014, LCEC and E.M., through her 
parents D.M. and L.M., sued the Department, as well as 
Linda Chavez and Peggy McDonald—two senior employees 
in the Department. LCEC sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief allowing LCEC to accept new students and to educate 
its public-school students with TLC’s regular-education 
students. E.M. sought injunctive and declaratory relief 
prohibiting the Department from acting “in a manner that 
precludes LCEC from implementing the mainstreaming 
component of E.M.’s IEP.” App. at 37.2 E.M. also sought her 
attorneys’ fees in bringing the suit, as permitted by 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B). 
After the District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request 
for a temporary restraining order, the parties filed and briefed 
a motion for a preliminary injunction on an accelerated basis. 
When the briefing was complete, the District Court held a 
hearing. The District Court, finding that the plaintiffs’ 
arguments had evolved, ordered supplemental briefing on the 
applicability of the “stay-put” rule to E.M.  
After the supplemental briefing, the District Court 
granted a preliminary injunction to E.M. only. It held that 
E.M. did not need to first seek a “stay-put” order from the 
administrative process, that the Department was altering 
E.M.’s “educational placement” by preventing LCEC from 
educating its public-school students with disabilities with 
                                              
2 “Mainstreaming” refers to the process in which 
students with disabilities are integrated with their non-
disabled peers in regular-education classrooms. 
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TLC’s regular-education students, and that, therefore, E.M. 
was entitled to an injunction while she challenged the 
Department’s actions. The District Court’s injunction orders 
that the Department be “enjoined from interfering with 
Plaintiff LCEC’s implementation of E.M.’s Individualized 
Education Plan” and applies “only to E.M. and no other 
student at LCEC.” App. at 2. The Department timely 
appealed.3 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this suit under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from 
the District Court’s order entering a preliminary injunction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
Typically, we review the District Court’s preliminary 
injunction under a “tripartite standard”: “We review the 
District Court’s findings of fact for clear error. Legal 
conclusions are assessed de novo. The ultimate decision to 
grant or deny the injunction is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.” K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 
710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). However, our review of a preliminary injunction 
entered pursuant to IDEA’s “stay-put” rule is more specific.  
The “stay-put” rule “functions, in essence, as an 
automatic preliminary injunction.” Drinker ex rel. Drinker v. 
Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1996). This is 
because, under the rule, “the child shall remain in the then-
current educational placement” while “proceedings conducted 
                                              
3 The Department has moved to dismiss LCEC’s and 
E.M.’s complaint. That motion is still pending before the 
District Court, although the District Court recently requested, 
and the parties have filed, supplemental briefing on the 
motion. 
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pursuant to [20 U.S.C. § 1415]” are ongoing. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(j). Thus, if the “stay-put” rule applies, children “are to 
remain in their current educational placement until the dispute 
with regard to their placement is ultimately resolved” 
“regardless of whether their case is meritorious or not.” 
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The “usual prerequisites to injunctive relief” 
are not required. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Therefore, the Court reviews the application of the “stay-put” 
rule to a given set of facts de novo. Id. at 865. 
III. 
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), “during the pendency of 
any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the 
State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise 
agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational 
placement of the child.” In other words, if there are 
“proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415]” ongoing and 
the child will otherwise be moved from her “then-current 
educational placement,” the child is entitled to an injunction 
against the change. We must, therefore, ask two questions. 
First, is E.M.’s suit against the Department a “proceeding[] 
conducted pursuant to [§ 1415]”? Second, is E.M.’s 
“educational placement” being altered? 
1. 
Whether E.M.’s suit against the Department—claiming 
that its directive to LCEC breaches its obligations under 
IDEA and denies her a free appropriate public education—
constitutes a “proceeding[] conducted pursuant to [§ 1415]” 
requires us to consider two subordinate issues. First, the 
federal courts must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
suit. Second, E.M.’s claim must be one that can be enforced 
through an action under § 1415. We begin with the subject-
matter jurisdiction issue. 
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IDEA authorizes an aggrieved party to file suit in a 
federal district court should there be a dispute as to whether a 
child is receiving a free appropriate public education. 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)-(3). However, a federal court may not 
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute unless 
state administrative remedies have been exhausted. Batchelor 
v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“In the normal case, exhausting the IDEA’s 
administrative process is required in order for the statute to 
grant subject matter jurisdiction to the district court.” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Exhaustion is not 
required in very limited circumstances, such as where 
exhaustion is futile or inadequate, where the question 
presented is purely legal, where the administrative process 
cannot grant relief, or where exhaustion would work a severe 
or irreparable harm upon a litigant. Komninos v. Upper 
Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778-79 (3d Cir. 
1994).  
Here, we find that the administrative process would be 
unable to grant relief, and so exhaustion of that process is 
unnecessary.4 Neither IDEA nor the New Jersey 
administrative code provides administrative means for a 
parent to challenge an action of a state agency, only to 
challenge action of a local public-school system. See, e.g., 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (“Whenever a complaint has been 
received . . . the parents or the local educational agency 
                                              
4 We recognize that the District Court is currently 
considering this issue in deciding the Department’s motion to 
dismiss. However, because exhaustion is a question of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, it should have been addressed 
first; if exhaustion were required, the District Court would 
have lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction. 
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involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity for an 
impartial due process hearing.” (emphasis added)); N.J. 
Admin. Code § 6A:14-2.7(h) (“When a parent requests a due 
process hearing . . . the district board of education shall have 
an opportunity to resolve the matter . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
E.M. does not challenge the action of her local public-school 
system. Rather, she agrees with what her local public-school 
system has decided: that she attend LCEC while attending 
classes with TLC’s regular-education students. It is the 
Department that would prevent her from doing so, and it is 
the Department’s action she wishes to challenge. Given that 
the administrative process “cannot grant relief” because the 
“hearing officer lacks authority to provide a remedy,” 
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778, her failure to exhaust her 
administrative remedies does not deprive the District Court of 
jurisdiction. 
We therefore turn to the second issue: does § 1415 
contemplate and allow E.M.’s suit against the Department? 
The answer is yes. E.M. believes that the Department’s 
interpretation of the scope of LCEC’s approvals is incorrect, 
arbitrary, and capricious. By imposing its interpretation of the 
scope of LCEC’s approvals on E.M., the Department would 
prevent E.M. from having her IEP implemented as worded: 
that she attend LCEC and integrated classes with students at 
TLC. Because receiving an education in compliance with her 
IEP is a part of receiving a free appropriate public education 
under IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D), the Department is 
thus arguably interfering with her ability to receive a free 
appropriate public education. The entire purpose of § 1415 is 
to provide parents “procedural safeguards with respect to the 
provision of a free appropriate public education.” Id. 
§ 1415(a). 
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Moreover, under IDEA, a parent who prevails in a 
lawsuit may receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Importantly, a district court can award 
attorneys’ fees to “a State educational agency” if it is the 
“prevailing party” and the underlying action was frivolous or 
was presented for an improper purpose. Id. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III). Therefore, because E.M.’s claim 
is one that concerns the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to her and because the Department is a permissible 
party in an IDEA lawsuit in a federal district court, we 
conclude that E.M.’s lawsuit against the Department is a 
“proceeding[] conducted pursuant to [§ 1415].” 
The Department’s arguments to the contrary rely on 
cases we find inapplicable. First, the Department relies on 
Judge Becker’s opinion in DeLeon v. Susquehanna 
Community School District, 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1984), and 
the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Tilton ex rel. Richards v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education, 705 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 
1983). In DeLeon, we considered whether a change in the 
way a child was transported to school was subject to the 
“stay-put” rule. 747 F.2d at 150. Previously, the school 
district paid the child’s parent to drive him to school; the 
school district began arranging group transportation instead. 
Id. at 151. We concluded that the change was not subject to 
the “stay-put” rule because the child’s educational placements 
were not changed. Id. at 153-54. The Department, however, 
emphasizes certain dicta from the opinion. Judge Becker 
opined that “possibly requiring school districts to raise 
substantial funds by taxation or transfer of appropriations” in 
order to keep a school open that a school district intended to 
close for financial reasons “raises substantial and sensitive 
separation of powers problems.” Id. at 153 n.8. 
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In Tilton, a local school district planned to close a full-
year education program for students with disabilities for 
budget reasons and to transfer the students to 180-day 
programs. 705 F.2d at 802, 804. The Sixth Circuit held that 
the “stay-put” rule did not apply to the district’s plan to close 
the programs for budgetary reasons because “nothing in the 
legislative history or the language of the Act implies a 
legislative intent to permit interested parties to utilize the 
automatic injunctive procedure of [the ‘stay-put’ rule] to 
frustrate the fiscal policy of participating states.” Id. at 804. 
The court noted that education “‘is committed to the control 
of state and local authorities’” and that applying “stay-put” to 
a budgetary decision “would effect a transfer of power.” Id. 
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 100 (1968)). 
Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held, challenging the financial 
decision to close schools was not something that triggered the 
“stay-put” rule. Id. at 804-05. 
From these cases, the Department would have us craft 
a rule that exempts state regulation of public and private 
schools from the reach of a § 1415 action. Both DeLeon and 
Tilton suggest that certain types of state or school district 
action—namely funding decisions—are not the proper 
subjects of a suit under IDEA. However, E.M.’s claim does 
not raise the same concerns as the hypothetical challenge in 
DeLeon and the actual challenge in Tilton. Those cases were 
concerned with preventing the “stay-put” rule from intruding 
on areas of state authority with which IDEA has only a 
tangential relationship—such as a budgetary decision.  
This is key, we think. E.M.’s claim focuses on a 
responsibility of the state educational agency under IDEA: 
proper regulation of private schools to which local public-
school districts will send students with disabilities. See 20 
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B). If the Department fails to do this 
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properly, it has directly breached one of its obligations under 
IDEA. In contrast, fiscal and administrative decisions may 
impact the education that a student receives under IDEA, but 
only indirectly; reallocating funds, for example, does not 
itself violate IDEA. The fact that E.M. challenges the way in 
which the Department performs one of its obligations as a 
state educational agency under IDEA demonstrates that 
E.M.’s claim falls within the ambit of § 1415. 
The Department next relies on O’Bannon v. Town 
Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980). In O’Bannon, 
federal and state regulators decided to end Medicare and 
Medicaid’s relationship with a nursing home because it “no 
longer met the statutory and regulatory standards for skilled 
nursing facilities.” Id. at 775-76. Residents residing at the 
facility by virtue of Medicaid would have been forced to 
move to a different nursing home or else pay their own way. 
Id. at 776. The residents wanted a due process hearing before 
the relationship was discontinued and for Medicaid to 
continue to pay for their continued residence at the nursing 
home in the meantime. Id. at 777. The Supreme Court 
determined that the residents lacked “an interest in receiving 
benefits for care in a particular facility that entitles them, as a 
matter of constitutional law, to a hearing before the 
Government can decertify that facility.” Id. at 784. This was 
because Medicaid did not “confer a right to continued 
residence in the home of one’s choice”; it only conferred “the 
right to choose among a range of qualified providers.” Id. at 
785. Because the end of the relationship “does not reduce or 
terminate a patient’s financial assistance, but merely requires 
him to use it for care at a different facility,” no due process 
interest was triggered. Id. at 785-86. 
The fact that O’Bannon is a constitutional due process 
case is what distinguishes it from this one. The residents in 
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O’Bannon were seeking to find an interest sufficient to trigger 
the protections of the Due Process Clause, and the Court 
concluded that no such interest existed. E.M. does not need 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution to get an 
injunction here. If she can show that she has begun a 
“proceeding[] conducted pursuant to [§ 1415]” and that she 
faces a change in her “then-current educational placement,” 
IDEA grants her an injunction. O’Bannon does not help us 
determine whether the first of these requirements is met, 
which is what we consider here. 
Finally, the Department relies on Dima v. 
Macchiarola, 513 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), and Corbett 
ex rel. Corbett v. Regional Center of the East Bay, Inc., 699 
F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In Dima, the district court 
denied a “stay-put” injunction against the local school board’s 
decision not to renew a contract with a private school, which 
would result in the transfer of students with disabilities to a 
different school. 513 F. Supp. at 566-68. In Corbett, the 
district court modified a pre-existing “stay-put” injunction to 
allow the state Department of Social Services proceedings to 
revoke the operating license of a facility to operate to move 
forward. 699 F. Supp. at 230-32. We do not think these cases 
are helpful to the issue of whether E.M.’s lawsuit is a 
“proceeding[] conducted pursuant to [§ 1415].” Dima 
concluded that “the transfer of these handicapped students” 
did not “constitute[] a change in ‘placement.’” 513 F. Supp. at 
568. Corbett, in turn, relied on Dima. 699 F. Supp. at 232. 
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Therefore, these cases do not persuade us that E.M. cannot 
sue the Department under § 1415.5 
We are satisfied that E.M.’s suit against the 
Department is a “proceeding[] conducted pursuant to 
[§ 1415].” However, this implies nothing about the merits of 
her claims against the Department. The merits of the 
underlying suit have no impact on whether “stay-put” applies 
in a given case, and we express no opinion on them here. See 
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (stating that “stay-put” applies 
“regardless of whether the[] case is meritorious or not”). 
Although there are circumstances when federal courts should 
not and cannot intervene in the licensing decisions of the 
State, we also envision circumstances in which federal law 
requires that we intervene, such as if the licensing decision is 
based on an impermissible motive under IDEA. Whether the 
particular action challenged is something that the federal 
courts can remedy must be determined in each case. Because 
a “stay-put” injunction applies regardless of the merits, we 
take this brief opportunity to emphasize that speed of a final 
resolution in these cases is in the best interest of all parties. 
                                              
5 Our dissenting colleague embraces the Department’s 
argument, stating that “the ‘stay put’ provision does not apply 
when the change in educational placement results from a 
broad policy decision grounded in matters of licensing, 
administration, or fiscal policy.” Dissent at 6-7. However, our 
colleague supports this statement, predominantly, with cases 
holding that no change in educational placement occurred. 
See, e.g., id. at 7 (citing cases). As explained below, we think 
that position has some force. However, we think that whether 
a change in placement has occurred is a different question 
than whether litigants can ever challenge a “broad policy 
decision” through IDEA. 
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2. 
Because E.M.’s suit is a “proceeding[] conducted 
pursuant to [§ 1415],” she is entitled to remain in her “then-
current educational placement” under § 1415(j). Therefore, 
she is entitled to an injunction should the Department attempt 
to alter her “educational placement.” E.M. says that by 
instructing LCEC not to allow its public-school students in 
classrooms with regular-education students from TLC, which 
is required by her IEP, the Department is attempting to alter 
her “educational placement.” The Department responds that 
E.M. can receive the same services provided by LCEC at a 
different school, so her “educational placement” is 
unchanged. To resolve this dispute, we have to address what 
“educational placement” means in this context. 
The term “educational placement” is not defined by 
IDEA or its implementing regulations. Nevertheless, this 
Court has previously interpreted the term to mean “whether [a 
change] is likely to affect in some significant way the child’s 
learning experience.” DeLeon, 747 F.2d at 153. This is 
because a change in the child’s educational placement 
“should be given an expansive reading, at least where 
changes affecting only an individual child’s program are at 
issue.” Id. We also consider the IEP of the child that is 
“actually functioning when the stay-put is invoked.” Drinker, 
78 F.3d at 867 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
E.M. argues, and the District Court held, that her 
current educational placement is to implement her IEP at 
LCEC and TLC. E.M. finds support for this position in 
Drinker; we held there that because the child’s IEP team “had 
determined the appropriate placement and location of 
services” for the child to be a particular school, that school 
was the child’s educational placement. Id. It also accords with 
the notion that an IEP for a child should identify the specific 
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locations at which the child is to receive special education 
services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII). 
The Department, however, argues that “educational 
placement” does not mean a specific school when a state or 
local agency acts in a way that affects a group of children, 
rather than in a way directed towards any individual child 
specifically. Instead, when the agency acts in a way that 
affects a group, “educational placement” means the overall 
educational requirements contained in the IEP. The 
Department contends that its actions are not targeted towards 
E.M. specifically, so if another school can provide E.M. with 
the programs included in her IEP, she is not entitled to remain 
at LCEC. 
In support of its position, the Department cites a 
statement by the U.S. Department of Education in the Federal 
Register and a group of cases from other circuits. The 
Department of Education, in creating implementing 
regulations for IDEA, drafted and implemented a regulation 
corresponding to the “stay-put” rule of § 1415(j). 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.518(a). The regulatory “stay-put” rule uses the same 
term, “educational placement,” that the statute uses. The term 
is not defined in the regulations even though it is a commonly 
used term throughout the implementing regulations. The lack 
of a definition was the subject of comments when the 
regulations were first publicized. The Department of 
Education noted that “[a] few commenters suggested that the 
term ‘educational placement’ be defined to include location, 
supports, and services provided.” Assistance to States for the 
Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants 
for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,687 
(Aug. 14, 2006) (emphasis added). The Department decided 
not to define the terms, although “[t]he Department’s 
longstanding position is that placement refers to the provision 
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of special education and related services rather than a 
specific place, such as a specific classroom or specific 
school.” Id. (emphasis added). 
The Courts of Appeals have also generally come to the 
same conclusion. In Concerned Parents & Citizens for the 
Continuing Education at Malcom X (PS 79) v. New York City 
Board of Education, the local board of education planned to 
close a school for budgetary reasons and transfer the students 
with disabilities to other schools; the parents of those children 
sought a “stay-put” order barring the closure while they 
challenged it. 629 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second 
Circuit held that “stay-put” was not triggered because the 
board of education was not changing the students’ 
educational placements even though they were being 
transferred. Id. at 753-54. The court reasoned that 
“educational placement” referred to “the general type of 
educational program in which the child is placed” or “the 
existence and classification of a handicap, and the most 
appropriate type of educational program for assisting a child 
with such a handicap.” Id. at 753-54. 
In AW ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax County School Board, 
a student was transferred from his preferred school for 
disciplinary reasons and challenged the transfer as being in 
violation of the “stay-put” rule. 372 F.3d 674, 676-77 (4th 
Cir. 2004). The Fourth Circuit found that “stay-put” did not 
apply because the student’s “educational placement” was not 
the specific school he attended but “the environment in which 
educational services are provided.” Id. at 682. As long as the 
new school “replicate[d] the educational program 
contemplated by the student’s original assignment,” there was 
no change in “educational placement.” Id.  
In Knight ex rel. Knight v. District of Columbia, a 
child objected to a new IEP that would transfer him from a 
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private school to a public school for the following school year 
and sought an injunction under the “stay-put” rule while he 
challenged the transfer. 877 F.2d 1025, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). The D.C. Circuit found that “stay-put” did not apply 
because “the only sense in which . . . the two schools are 
dissimilar is that [one] is a private school and [the other] is a 
public school.” Id. at 1028. The court concluded that as long 
as the public school was able to implement the child’s IEP 
there was no change in the child’s “educational placement.” 
Id.6  
These decisions indicate that, at least in some 
situations, a child’s “educational placement” does not include 
the specific school the child attends. But in each of these 
decisions, an alternative location provided sufficient services 
to satisfy the requirements of the student’s IEP. See 
Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 756 (noting that the record 
reflected “a good faith effort to preserve intact as far as 
possible the basic educational programs that the transferred 
children had formerly enjoyed”); AW, 372 F.3d at 683 
(finding nothing in the record to indicate that “the new 
location cannot fairly be described as an identical setting”); 
Knight, 877 F.2d at 1029-30 (finding no evidence in the 
record that the student would be unable to obtain similar 
educational benefits at the new school). 
                                              
6 The Department also relies on White ex rel. White v. 
Ascension Parish School Board, 343 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 
2003). That case is not a “stay-put” case. However, the Fifth 
Circuit did conclude in that case that “educational placement” 
as that term is used in IDEA “means educational program—
not the particular institution where that program is 
implemented.” Id. at 379.  
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These decisions are consistent with our opinion in 
DeLeon. Judge Becker in DeLeon noted that “[t]he question 
of what constitutes a change in educational placement is, 
necessarily, fact specific.” 747 F.2d at 153. The record in 
DeLeon did not indicate that changes to the student’s 
transportation plan would have a “substantial, detrimental 
impact” on the student’s education. Id. at 154. Judge Becker 
also noted that decisions concerning “the interests of a large 
number of children” involve “entirely different problem[s]” 
than decisions that affect or are targeted towards one child. 
Id. at 153. This is because decisions affecting a group as a 
whole “are broad ‘policy’ decisions rather than individual 
choices concerning particular children.” Id. 
The Eighth Circuit summarized this dichotomy well: 
A transfer to a different school building 
for fiscal or other reasons unrelated to 
the disabled child has generally not been 
deemed a change in placement, whereas 
an expulsion from school or some other 
change in location made on account of 
the disabled child or his behavior has 
usually been deemed a change in 
educational placement that violates the 
stay-put provision if made unilaterally. 
 
Hale ex rel. Hale v. Poplar Bluffs R-I Sch. Dist., 280 F.3d 
831, 834 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (agreeing with the 
district court’s factual determination that changing the 
location of instruction for a student from his home to a school 
effected a change to his educational placement); see also Bd. 
of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218 v. Ill. State Bd. of 
Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e adopt our 
sister circuits’ fact-driven approach. We accept as the outer 
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parameters of ‘educational placement’ that it means 
something more than the actual school attended by the child 
and something less than the child’s ultimate educational 
goals.”). This dichotomy is appropriate because one of the 
primary concerns of IDEA was to prevent schools or 
educational agencies from excluding “hard-to-handle disabled 
students” from classrooms. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324 
(1988).  
We are operating in this case in a gray area. The facts 
of this case are distinguishable from the decisions involving 
school closures for general budgetary or administrative 
reasons. See, e.g., N.D. ex rel. Parents Acting as Guardians 
Ad Litem v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (concluding that a reduction in school days 
“affect[s] all public schools and all students, disabled and 
non-disabled alike”); Tilton, 705 F.2d at 805 (“[I]f a state or 
local agency must discontinue a program or close a facility 
for purely budgetary reasons, the requirements of [the stay-
put provision] do not apply.”). The Department’s “no 
mainstreaming” directive does not affect disabled and non-
disabled students equally—it impacts E.M. substantially more 
than her non-disabled peers. This case occupies a middle 
ground between the broad policy decisions and the 
individually targeted actions described in DeLeon. 
The language of IDEA is broad enough to cover 
circumstances other than those that purely address a single 
student. The State’s legitimate interest in regulating private 
schools like LCEC and TLC is such that it can rightly 
communicate its licensing concerns to the administrators of 
those schools, but it cannot wield its regulatory authority in a 
fashion that immediately and without notice—or any 
proposed alternative—requires a child’s IEP to be dispensed 
with while administrators are in discussions about licensing 
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requirements. A main point of the “stay-put” provision in 
IDEA is to protect individual students while educational 
regulators and those interested in a child’s education are 
working out disputes. We are not suggesting that E.M.’s 
“educational placement” requires that she stay at LCEC. We 
are saying rather that her “placement” is at least the program 
identified in her IEP and that the Department’s actions in this 
particular case are, if there is no viable educational 
alternative, recognizable as effecting a change in that 
placement and hence subjecting the Department to a “stay-
put” injunction of the limited variety imposed by the District 
Court.  
3. 
To reiterate, we have no occasion to decide whether 
moving E.M. to another school would constitute a change in 
“placement.” One aspect of this case that must be particularly 
frustrating to E.M.’s parents and perhaps to E.M. herself is 
that nothing in the course of the disputations between E.M.’s 
school and the Department seems to have taken account of 
whether another school is available to satisfy the 
requirements of E.M.’s IEP. She has been caught in a 
bureaucratic crossfire in which scant attention, if any, has 
been directed at alternatives to satisfy her educational needs. 
The District Court appears to have understood that problem 
and sought to prevent E.M. becoming a casualty of evolving 
discussions on the future of her present school. We do not 
understand the District Court to have taken any position on 
whether the “stay-put” injunction will survive a decision by 
the Department to close LCEC or by the local public-school 
system to transfer students like E.M. to another school 
capable of implementing their IEPs. Nor do we. Instead, 
given the unsettled state of the record (which does not even 
contain a copy of E.M.’s IEP, just a summary from provisions 
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of the Verified Complaint), we think it best to remand the 
case, with the “stay-put” injunction in place, for further 
development of the record, including whether other 
educational alternatives are available to E.M. and her family 
as a new school year approaches.  
IV. 
For these reasons, we remand this case to the District 
Court for additional fact finding consistent with this opinion. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
At its core, this case is a licensing dispute between the 
New Jersey Department of Education (“NJDOE”) and the 
Learning Center for Exceptional Children (“LCEC”).  
Thwarted at the state administrative level, LCEC filed this 
lawsuit, joined by E.M. and her parents, in an effort to 
forestall NJDOE’s actions.  Plaintiffs have attempted to stop 
NJDOE by relying on a provision of the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, 
that is meant to prevent local agencies from changing a 
child’s education while the school and the parents address 
their disputes about the child’s educational placement.  As 
more fully explained herein, § 1415 does not provide a basis 
for relief here because: (1) Plaintiffs do not satisfy the 
unambiguous statutory prerequisites; and (2) this provision 
does not cover challenges to a state’s licensing decision that 
equally applies to all students at a particular school.  For these 
reasons, I dissent.   
 
I 
 
As the Majority has explained, E.M. is a disabled 
student receiving special education services at LCEC 
pursuant to an individualized education plan (“IEP”) devised 
by her parents and the Hoboken School District.  Her IEP 
requires that a portion of her education be conducted with 
typically developing peers.  This is known as 
“mainstreaming.”  App. 21.  Because LCEC only enrolls 
public school special education students, it arranged for 
students at its sister school, Today’s Learning Center, which 
enrolls private school general education students, to 
participate in activities with LCEC students. 
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 The NJDOE has asserted that LCEC is not authorized 
to educate private school general education students alongside 
public school special education students.  When LCEC failed 
to assure the NJDOE that such education was not occurring, 
NJDOE placed LCEC on conditional approval status, which 
meant it could not accept new students.  LCEC, which 
consequently lost students (and revenue), construed this 
directive as barring mainstreaming, thereby limiting its ability 
to educate E.M. according to her IEP and contravening the 
IDEA’s goal of ensuring that students are educated in the 
least restrictive environment possible.    
 
E.M. is caught in the cross-fire of this regulatory 
dispute: her IEP requires mainstreaming, but the school she 
attends cannot provide it.  E.M. has invoked § 1415(j), 
IDEA’s “stay put” provision, to enjoin the NJDOE from 
interfering with the mainstreaming component of her IEP 
while the dispute between the NJDOE and LCEC remains 
unresolved.  The able District Judge, confronted with the 
Plaintiffs’ frequently shifting positions on the relief sought 
and the basis for it, relied upon § 1415(j) and granted E.M. 
relief.   
 
The narrow issue before us is whether the IDEA’s 
“stay put” provision is an appropriate mechanism to provide 
the relief E.M. seeks, namely the ability to obtain 
uninterrupted mainstreaming opportunities at LCEC.  
Because Plaintiffs have not satisfied the conditions for 
obtaining “stay put” relief under § 1415, E.M. is not entitled 
to an injunction under this provision.  In addition, because 
Plaintiffs are, in effect, challenging a state regulator’s policy 
that applies to all children at the school, rather than a local 
educational agency’s decision specifically concerning E.M.’s 
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IEP, the “stay put” provision does not apply and cannot 
provide a basis to enjoin the NJDOE’s regulatory actions.     
 
II 
 
 As the Majority thoroughly explains, under the IDEA, 
parents and guardians play a central role in the education of 
their special needs children.  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. 
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 
308 (1988).  To this end, they participate in the creation of an 
IEP and must be provided with “[w]ritten prior notice” 
whenever the “local educational agency . . . proposes to 
initiate or change” or “refuses to initiate or change” the 
“educational placement of the child.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(3).  If the parent is dissatisfied, then he or she may 
“present a complaint,” to which the local educational agency 
must respond.  Id. § 1415(b)(6), (c)(2)(B).  The parents are 
then entitled to an impartial hearing, an appeal to the state 
educational agency, and judicial review of the state 
educational agency’s decision.  Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A), (g).  
 
 Recognizing that these due process safeguards may 
result in lengthy proceedings, Congress enacted a “stay put” 
provision that “protects the status quo of a child’s educational 
placement,” C.H. ex rel. Hayes v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 
606 F.3d 59, 72 (3d Cir. 2010), by preventing “school 
districts from effecting unilateral change in a child’s 
educational program” during the proceedings.  Susquenita 
Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. ex rel. Heidi S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 
1996).  The “stay put” provision provides:  
 
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section, unless the 
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State or local educational agency and the 
parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain 
in the then-current educational placement of the 
child, or, if applying for initial admission to a 
public school, shall, with the consent of the 
parents, be placed in the public program until 
all such proceedings have been completed. 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).1  When read together with the IDEA’s 
due process safeguards, the “stay put” provision is only 
triggered (1) during the pendency of proceedings conducted 
under § 1415 (2) when initiated by a parent who files a due 
process complaint (3) in response to a proposed change in the 
student’s educational placement.  None of these prerequisites 
are met.   
   
 Plaintiffs filed this action in District Court without first 
initiating a proceeding under § 1415.  Proceedings under 
§ 1415 focus on the individual student’s education, 
“includ[ing] the conduct and development of evaluations, 
eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.”  
Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 
F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir. 2000).  No such proceeding 
concerning E.M.’s education has been initiated.  Although the 
Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a 
                                              
 1 Because the IDEA’s predecessor statutes contained a 
“stay put” provision similar to that of the IDEA, we may 
properly look to cases that predate the IDEA for guidance in 
interpreting its “stay put” provision.  See Pardini v. Allegheny 
Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005); Oberti v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 
1204, 1206 (3d Cir. 1993).    
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“proceeding” under § 1415, the proper inquiry is whether 
there exists a separate pending § 1415 proceeding, such as a 
due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a 
complaint.  Because “stay put” operates only “[d]uring the 
pendency” of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has 
been initiated, § 1415’s “stay put” provision simply does not 
apply.  See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F. Supp. 11, 
14 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that a federal action to enforce the 
“stay put” provision is not itself a pending proceeding under 
§ 1415 that triggers “stay put”). 
 
 Moreover, as the Majority acknowledges, there is no 
evidence that a change in E.M.’s educational placement has 
been proposed or has occurred as the plain wording of § 1415 
requires.  The present record does not show that the Hoboken 
School District has taken steps to change E.M.’s IEP, that it 
intends to move E.M. to a different school with a different 
educational program, or that she presently lacks the 
mainstreaming opportunity that has been described as being 
part of her IEP.2  Indeed, even the Majority cannot dispute 
that the record is silent as to whether there has been any 
actual or proposed change in E.M.’s educational placement.3  
                                              
 2As the Majority correctly notes, E.M.’s IEP is not part 
of the record and the only information about it comes from 
assertions in the pleadings.  
 
 3 To the extent Plaintiffs argue that E.M.’s educational 
placement has changed because LCEC no longer provides 
mainstreaming, they have asserted the wrong claim.  The 
proper vehicle to challenge a failure to provide 
mainstreaming consistent with the requirements of E.M.’s 
IEP is a claim against the Hoboken School District for 
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The majority also discusses exhaustion and concludes that it 
is not required here because the IDEA does not allow a parent 
to challenge a state agency’s licensing decision but rather 
provides a means to challenge changes to an individual’s 
educational placement.  For reasons that I will explain, I 
agree.  Indeed, that reasoning underscores why this is not a 
proceeding about E.M.’s educational placement covered by § 
1415.   
 
 For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the 
prerequisites to obtain a “stay put” order under § 1415 and, 
therefore, on this record, relief on that basis should not have 
been granted.   
 
III 
 
 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the “stay put” provision fails for 
an additional reason.  Even if Plaintiffs would otherwise 
satisfy the requirements for a change in educational 
placement under § 1415, they cannot overcome the general 
rule that the “stay put” provision does not apply when such a 
change results from a broad policy decision grounded in 
matters of licensing, administration, or fiscal policy, as 
opposed to a decision about an individual student.  See, e.g. 
N.D. ex rel. Parents Acting as Guardians Ad Litem v. Haw. 
Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (state 
implementation of furloughs that closed schools on Fridays 
was a state-wide administrative decision that did not 
constitute a change in placement triggering the “stay put” 
provision, although it could give rise to a failure to implement 
                                                                                                     
“failure to implement” her IEP.  See Houston Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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claim); Weil v. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 931 
F.2d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that “if the change in 
‘educational placement’ is necessitated by the closure of a 
facility for reasons beyond the control of the public agency, 
the ‘stay-put’ provisions . . . do not apply”); DeLeon v. 
Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149, 153, 153 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1984) (distinguishing cases that involved “broad 
policy decisions” that “could interfere with resource 
allocation” and applying “an expansive reading” to “change 
in educational placement” where “the decision involved is 
one that affects the educational program of an individual 
child” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
While the Majority correctly points out that many cases that 
have refused to apply the “stay put” provision to counteract 
policy decisions have involved school closures due to budget 
allocation decisions, the same logic applies to similar state 
regulatory interests.  Setting state educational policy, 
accrediting particular schools, and making difficult 
prioritization decisions through the budgetary process are all 
essential facets of the NJDOE’s regulatory role.  
 
 There are several reasons for denying individual 
plaintiffs the ability to invoke the “stay put” provision when 
they are challenging a system-wide policy or decision.  First, 
“nothing in the legislative history or the language of the 
[IDEA] implies a legislative intent to permit interested parties 
to utilize the automatic injunction procedure of [the ‘stay put’ 
provision] to frustrate the” state’s policy decisions.  Tilton by 
Richards v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804 
(6th Cir. 1983); N.D., 600 F.3d at 1116 (“Congress did not 
intend for the IDEA to apply to system wide administrative 
decisions,” and thus the “stay put” provision does not apply 
where a program or school is closed due to budgetary 
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reasons).  To the contrary, Congress had two goals in 
enacting the procedural protections of § 1415: (1) “to prevent 
the erroneous identification or classification of children as 
handicapped and the impairment of their subsequent 
education by ensuring that parents would be afforded prior 
notice and an opportunity to participate in such fundamental 
determinations,” Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 754;4 and (2) 
to prevent the “‘total exclusion’ of disabled children” from 
school and their warehousing in specialized institutions, N.D., 
600 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Honig, 484 U.S. 325 n.8).  To 
address this latter concern, the “stay put” provision 
“strip[ped] schools of the unilateral authority [they] had 
traditionally employed to exclude disabled students from 
school and to protect children from any retaliatory action by 
the agency.”  N.D., 600 F.3d at 1114 (internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citations omitted); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(c)(2)(B).  Because a policy decision that applies to all 
students “does not conflict with Congress’s intent of 
protecting disabled children from being singled out,” N.D., 
600 F.3d at 1117, § 1415 is not a mechanism for challenging 
such decisions. 
 
 Second, permitting the “stay put” provision to be 
employed to challenge state policy decisions would effect a 
transfer of power from the state to parents.  Tilton, 705 F.2d 
at 804 (state and local obligations under the IDEA do not 
                                              
 4 See also Tilton, 705 F.2d at 804; S. Rep. No. 94-168, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975) (showing the Senate 
Committee was “deeply concerned about practices and 
procedures which result in classifying children as having 
handicapping conditions when, in fact, they do not have such 
conditions.”)  
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result in an abdication of control to the parents over matters 
concerning the allocation of a school system’s educational 
resources); N.D., 600 F.3d at 1117 (“To allow the stay-put 
provisions to apply [to forestall furloughs] would be 
essentially to give the parents of disabled children veto power 
over a state’s decisions regarding the management of its 
schools.  The IDEA did not intend to strip administrative 
powers away from local school boards and give them to 
parents of individual children.”).  Relatedly, permitting an 
individual student to invoke the “stay put” provision to 
forestall system-wide actions necessitated by policy 
decisions, particularly budgetary concerns, “could undermine 
the statutory purpose of providing an appropriate education to 
all handicapped children.”  Tilton, 705 F.2d at 805 (emphasis 
in original).  Allowing a student to use the “stay put” 
provision to block implementation of an action that applies to 
all students could obligate the state, “against its reasoned 
judgment, to finance a program for some handicapped 
children because of the bare allegations of a single interested 
party,” and such “forced spending might well deprive other 
handicapped children of needed resources.”  Id.5   
 
                                              
 5 Under the Majority’s rule, if a system-wide decision 
or policy results in closing a school and if there are no viable 
alternative programs for a particular student, then that student 
would be permitted to stop the implementation of the decision 
or policy, even if the state had a reason for its actions.  If a 
decision or policy resulted in a particular student having no 
alternatives, the answer is to create an alternative, not to 
require the state to allow a school to operate in contravention 
of the rule or policy. 
 10 
 
 Third, the power to approve programs and control 
fiscal matters is a power vested with the state.  Dima v. 
Macchiarola, 513 F. Supp. 565, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(“Congress never intended to expand these classification 
safeguards to obstruct a decision by the Board or the State to 
retain or discard the services of a private school. . . .  [T]hey 
must be permitted to make an independent determination 
regarding the suitability of private institutions to fulfill the 
educational and fiscal needs of the system without first 
according the parents and guardians a due process forum,” 
and thus school board’s refusal to contract with school was a 
policy decision that did not trigger the notice and hearing 
requirements of § 1415); Corbett for Corbett v. Reg’l Ctr. of 
the East Bay, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 230, 232 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 
(noting that an agency is “responsible for protecting the 
integrity of [its l]icensing system, and the health and safety of 
residents of licensed facilities” and holding that revocation of 
a service provider’s license did not trigger the “stay put” 
provision because the state agency “must be permitted to 
challenge, in good faith, [a service provider’s] license to 
operate a community care facility based on legitimate health 
and safety concerns”); see also White, 343 F.3d at 380 
(noting that where a school district had “elected to provide 
services at a centralized location” rather than in a particular 
neighborhood, “[t]his [was] a permissible policy choice under 
the IDEA”); Flour Bluff, 91 F.3d at 694 (recognizing that 
states may choose to employ regional day schools to better 
“allocat[e] the[ir] limited resources” so as to “better . . . 
provide for its disabled students”).  The IDEA recognizes that 
states “shall determine whether [private] schools and facilities 
meet the standards that apply to State educational agencies 
and local educational agencies and that children so served 
have all the rights the children would have if served by such 
 11 
 
agencies.”  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(ii).  The IDEA, in 
effect, “expressly incorporates State educational standards.”  
Schimmel by Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 484 (4th 
Cir. 1987).  “Because unapproved private schools do not meet 
the State educational standards,” the IDEA “does not require 
[a state’s] school systems to place and fund handicapped 
children in unapproved private schools.”  Id.; see also 
Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 640 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (holding district court lacked authority to order 
placement at a school not approved by the state).  Thus, the 
statute’s goal of protecting individual students combined with 
the state’s obligation to approve schools for the benefit of all 
students demonstrate that a statutory provision geared to 
protect individual students was not meant to be a mechanism 
to challenge decisions that apply to all students, even if an 
individual student is impacted by that decision in a unique 
way.6    
 
 Here, Plaintiffs seek to “[e]njoin[] the [Defendants] 
from enforcing N.J.A.C. 6A:14-4.7(a) in a manner that 
precludes LCEC from implementing the mainstreaming 
component of E.M.’s IEP.”  App. 37.  This claim in effect 
challenges the NJDOE’s licensing decision concerning 
LCEC.  Although Plaintiffs have attempted to cast NJDOE’s 
decision as a violation of E.M.’s IEP because enforcement of 
                                              
 6 This is not to say that the IDEA could never be used 
as a vehicle to challenge a policy decision that violates the 
statute nor is it to say that other avenues for relief cannot be 
pursued to protect the interests of an individual child.  Rather, 
challenges to universally applicable policy decisions do not 
trigger an individual student’s right to “stay put” under § 
1415.   
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the regulation will impact her, there is no allegation that 
NJDOE’s enforcement of the regulation targets E.M. or 
changes her IEP.  In fact, NJDOE’s position equally applies 
to all LCEC students with an IEP that provides for 
mainstreaming.  Thus, Plaintiffs challenge a policy decision 
that does not trigger the “stay put” provision.  See Tilton, 705 
F.2d at 805 (decision to close school “for purely budgetary 
reasons” did not trigger “stay put” provision); Corbett, 699 F. 
Supp. at 232 (revocation of a service provider’s license was 
policy decision that did not trigger the “stay put” provision). 
 E.M. is entitled to every protection available to her, 
including a free and appropriate education in the least 
restrictive environment.  Nonetheless, efforts to secure these 
protections must be brought against the proper parties in the 
proper forum.   
 
 For all of these reasons, I would vacate the order 
granting “stay put” relief under § 1415.   
